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A Practitioner's Guide to Defenses
Under the New Pennsylvania
Crimes Code
Sheldon S. Toll*
Prior to the enactment of the Crimes Code,' criminal defenses in
Pennsylvania were largely non-statutory. While the Crimes Code did
not abolish common law defenses, 2 it did enact statutory definitions of
many defenses.8 This article will first address itself to the question of
burden of proof of defenses under the Crimes Code, and then will proceed to discuss interesting developments with respect to several defenses.
I.

DEFENSES-BURDEN OF PROOF

While Pennsylvania's Crime Code adopted substantial portions of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Pennsylvania did not enact section 1.12 of the Model Penal Code which provided, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(1) No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element
of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence
of such proof, the innocence of the defendent is assumed.
(2) Subsection (1) of this Section does not:
(a) require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless and
until there is evidence supporting such defense; or
(b) apply to any defense which the Code or another statute
plainly requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of
evidence.
(3) A ground of defense is affirmative, within the meaning of Subsection (2)(a) of this Section, when:
(a) it arises under a section of the Code which so provides; or
* A.B., Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1962; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1967; M.A., Oxford
Univ., 1970; Reporter for the Pennsylvania Crimes Code.
1. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 101-7504 (1973).
2. Id. § 107(b), relating to the abolition of common law crimes, provides: "No conduct
constitutes a crime unless it is a crime under this title or another statute of this Commonwealth."
3. The Appendix to this article contains an alphabetical listing of defenses under the
Crimes Code. One important defense, that of insanity, is not covered by the Crimes Code.
See note 18 infra.
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(b) it relates to an offense defined by a statute other than the
Code and such statute so provides; or
(c) it involves a matter of excuse or justification peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendant on which he can fairly
be required to adduce supporting evidence.
One of the predecessor versions of the Crimes Code, Senate Bill No.
38, 1967 session, did contain a section 114, which was based on section
1.12 of the Model Penal Code, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element
of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.
This subsection does not:
(1) require the disproof of a defense unless and until there is
evidence supporting such defense; or
(2) apply to any defense which the code or another statute
plainly requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of
evidence.
The Joint State Government Commission's comment on this provision
stated:
This section is derived from Section 1.12 of the Model Penal Code.
The Model Penal Code reference to and definition of "affirmative
defense" were deleted because of the difficulty which would occur
in distinguishing between the Commonwealth's burden of showing
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant's burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Such a provision would only serve to
perpetuate the existing confusion.
Existing law is in a state of confusion concerning the matters
covered by Subsection . . . (a) ....
It is intended by this section to
clarify existing law. Under Subsection (a) it is clear that the
Commonwealth is required to disprove a defense if there is evidence supporting such defense. The burden always rests on the
Commonwealth. 4
Since Pennsylvania did not adopt section 1.12 of the Model Penal
Code, the Model Penal Code's definition of the term "element of an
offense," which Pennsylvania did adopt,5 becomes significant. The term
"element of an offense" is defined, inter alia, as:
4. JOINT
(1967).
5.

850

STATE

GOVERNMENT

COMMISSION,

PROPOSED

CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 103 (1973).

CRIMES CODE

FOR

PENNSYLVANIA

Practitioner's Outline of Defenses
Such conduct or such attendant circumstances or such a result of
conduct as . . . negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct ....

Coupled with the legislative adoption of this definition of "element of
an offense" is the fact that as to several defenses in the Crimes Code, the
legislature specified that the defendant has the burden of establishing
such defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. The following sections of the Crimes Code contain the only defenses specified by the
legislature as affirmative defenses:
Credit cards-§ 4106(b)
Deceptive business practices---§ 4107(b)
Due diligence, corporations-§ 307(d)
Entrapment-§ 313(b)
Mistake as to age-§ 3102
Prohibited offensive weapons908(b)
Sexually promiscuous complainants--§ 3104
Theft, grading--§ 3903(b)
Theft of trade secrets--§ 3930(d)
Indeed, the philosophy underlying the adoption of such provisions
was that "it is desirable that so far as possible affirmative defenses be
identified specifically by the legislature." 7
In light of the above, the conclusion seems inescapable that as to
each other defense in the Crimes Code, once such defense is raised by
the defendant at trial, the Commonwealth has the burden of disproving
such defense beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the burden
of proof as to defenses under the Crimes Code is virtually the same as
it would have been if section 1.12 of the Model Penal Code had been
adopted. As it was explained in the comments to the Model Penal Code,
".. . unless there is evidence supporting the defense, there is no issue
on the point to be submitted to the jury. When, however, there is evidence supporting the defense (whether presented by the prosecution or
defendant), the prosecution has the normal burden; the defense must
be negatived by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." s
With respect to the defendant's evidential burden, neither the
Crimes Code nor the Model Penal Code attempt to state how strong
the evidence must be to satisfy the requirement that there is evidence
6.
7.
8.

Id.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

Id.
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supporting the defense. The American Law Institute thought it wiser
to leave this assertion to the courts.9 However, the Model Penal Code
comments do go on to state:
It should suffice to put the prosecution to its proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shows enough to justify such doubt
upon the issue. We think that most courts would construe the section in this way.' 0
The states of New York and Illinois also adopted substantial portions
of the Model Penal Code. However, neither state substantially adopted
section 1.12 of the Model Penal Code.
The New York legislation relating to the burden of proof as to
defenses is as follows:
(1) When a "defense," other than an "affirmative defense," defined by statute is raised at a trial, the people have the burden of
disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2) When a defense declared by statute to be an "affirmative defense" is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence."
Apparently, prior to New York's adoption of this provision, there was
no type of defense as to which the defendant had the burden of proof.
The New York Court of Appeals repeatedly held that when any of the
recognized defenses was raised by a defendant, the burden of proof with
respect thereto shifted to the prosecution, which was then required to
2
disprove such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The Illinois legislation relating to the burden of proof as to defenses
is as follows:
(a) "Affirmative defense" means that unless the State's evidence
raises the issue involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to
raise the issue, must present some evidence thereon.
(b) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense is raised then
the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt as1 to that issue together with all the
other elements of the offense.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. N.Y. PENAL -Aw § 25.00 (McKinney 1967).
12. People v. Kelly, 302 N.Y. 512, 99 N.E.2d 552 (1951); People v. Sandgren, 302 N.Y.
331, 98 N.E.2d 460 (1951); People v. Egnor, 175 N.Y. 419, 67 N.E. 906 (1903); People v.
Downs, 123 N.Y. 558, 25 N.E. 988 (1890); People v. Riordan, 117 N.Y. 71, 22 N.E. 455 (1889).
13. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
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It is interesting to note that Illinois uses the term "affirmative defense" in a slightly different manner. In Illinois, the term "affirmative
defense" does not indicate that the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, the Crimes Code has not changed Pennsylvania law regarding
the defendant's evidential burden as to defenses. The defendant, to
raise the issue, must present some evidence thereon. 14 However, the
Crimes Code has changed Pennsylvania law with regard to the burden
of proof as to many defenses by shifting the burden of proof to the
Commonwealth. For example, under prior law, the defendant had the
burden of proof as to the defenses of intoxication, 1 5 self defense,' 6 and
insanity.17 Although the defense of insanity is not covered by the
Crimes Code,'8 there seems little reason to doubt that the Crimes Code
shifts the burden of proof with regard to insanity to the Commonwealth.
The following is a discussion of some interesting developments in the
Crimes Code with respect to several defenses.
II.

DEFENSE OF RENUNCIATION

The defense of renunciation is a new defense and it is made available in connection with accomplice liability, 19 and the inchoate crimes
of attempt, 20 solicitation, 2' and conspiracy. 22 The rationale for providing such a defense is to encourage prospective criminals to renounce
their criminal pursuit before they consummate it.
The most elaborate of these provisions are the ones relating to accomplices and attempts, as follows:
[A person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another
person if] he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of
the offense and:
(i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the
offense; or
14. See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
15. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223, 109 A. 878 (1920).
16; Commonwealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A.2d 260 (1952).
17. Comonwealth v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 123 A. 486 (1924).
18. Chapter 7 of the Crimes Code dealing with "Responsibility" is reserved for future
legislation. Thus, Pennsylvania still retains the long-established M'Naughton rule. See text
accompanying note 2 supra.
19. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 306(f)(3) (1973).

20. Id. § 901(c).
21. Id. § 902(b).
22. Id. § 903(f).
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(ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or
makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the
otherwise
23
offense.
Renunciation.(1) In any prosecution for an attempt to commit a crime, it is a
defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and
complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the defendant
avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning his
criminal effort and, if the mere abandonment was insufficient to
accomplish such avoidance, by taking further and affirmative steps
which prevented the commission thereof.
(2) A renunciation is not "voluntary and complete" within the
meaning of this subsection if it is motivated in whole or part by:
(i) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another
participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render more
difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or
(ii) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another
effort to another victim or antime or to transfer the criminal
24
other but similar objective.
The renunciation provision in connection with an attempt states that
"if the mere abandonment was insufficient to accomplish such avoidance . . . [the defendant must have taken] further affirmative steps
which prevented the commission" of the crime attempted. This provision gives no further indication as to precisely what the "further affirmative steps" consist of, but it seems clear from a reading of the renunciation provision relating to accomplices25 that giving timely warning to
law enforcement authorities would be one such affirmative step.
III.

CORPORATIONS-DEFENSE

OF DuE DILIGENCE

Where a corporation or an unincorporated association is charged
with an offense not involving strict liability,26 the Crimes Code provides: it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance
of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence
to prevent its commission. This subsection shall not apply if it is plainly
inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular
2S.
24.
25.
26.
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Id. § 901(c).
Id. § 306(f)(3).
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offense.27 This provision was based on section 2.07 of the Model Penal
Code; the comments thereto aptly summarize its significance:
Subsection . . . [(d)] makes an important contribution to the

rationalization of corporate criminal responsibility. It is based on
the assumption that a primary purpose of the corporate fine is to
encourage diligent supervision of corporate personnel by managerial
employees in those cases in which the corporation is bound by the
conduct of inferior personnel. .

.

. Where that diligence can be

shown by a preponderance of the evidence, exculpation should
follow except in those cases where such a defense is clearly inconsistent with the legislative purpose manifested in defining the particular offense. If the legislature has imposed strict liability on the
corporate agent for the commission of the offense, even where that
agent has employed due diligence, there would seem to be no reason to exculpate the corporation on the ground of due diligence on
the part of supervisory personnel. The same defense subject to the
28
same limitations is made available to unincorporated associations.
The Crimes Code does not specify the requirements of the phrase
"due diligence." However, a recent federal antitrust decision, United
States v. Hilton Hotel Corp.,29 gives an indication of how far the courts
will go in construing a due diligence requirement. In that case, the
Ninthi Circuit held that even express instructions to corporate employees concerning obedience to the antitrust laws will not exculpate
either the corporate entity or high managerial agents if the instructions
are "general" and no steps have been taken to enforce the instructions
"by means commensurate with the obvious risks."

IV.

DRUGGED CONDITION

The Crimes Codes provides that:
Intoxication or drugged condition are not, as such, defenses to a
criminal charge; but in any prosecution for any offense, evidence
of intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may be
whenever it is relevant to negative an
offered by the defendant
30
element of the offense.
Since this provision applies to narcotic drugs as well as alcohol, it may
well be asked whether this section will provide a new defense for per27.
28.
29.
30.

CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 307(d) (1973).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955).
74,190, at 92,925 (9th Cir. 1972).
1972 Trade Cas.
CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 308 (1973).
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sons committing crimes while under the influence of narcotics. A negative answer to this question was given by the Model Penal Code
commentators, who explained their position as follows:
It may be noted that the use of narcotic drugs does not generally
present the same problems as the use of alcohol. Narcotic addicts
may resort to crime to obtain funds for drugs to prevent withdrawal symptoms and when they do they are, of course, held
accountable. The effect of a narcotic is to make the addict less
aggressive without any great interference with mental powers.
It is common popular belief that opiates per se (apart from the
phenomenon of physical dependency) directly incite otherwise
normal persons to violent assaultive criminal acts, including sexual
crimes. This view is not tenable. Opiates are quieting drugs that
repress hostile urges, create a passive, dreamy state and depress
sexual drives. On the other hand, the opiates are valuable to
criminals in other ways. They allay anxieties and, therefore, supply a kind of a "dutch courage" which may be valuable to criminals
in the commission of certain acts such as petty thievery. It is
particularly important to note that this "dutch courage" is achieved
without any great deterioration in mental ability or manual
dexterity, such as is induced by alcohol and other drugs.3 1
It is therefore to be expected that this Section will have no
practical bearing on the commission of crimes under the influence
of narcotics or effect any change in their position under existing
law.3 2
V.

DuRnss

The Crimes Code provision relating to the defense of duress liberalizes pre-existing law. The Crimes Code provides:
(a) General rule.-It is a defense that the actor engaged in the
conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to
do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his
person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
(b) Exception.-The defense provided by subsection (a) of this
section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a
situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to
31. The Model Penal Code comment cited AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON
MENTAL HEALTn, REPORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 4 (1957).
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in
placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to
establish culpability for the offense charged.83
Under the Crimes Code, the duress does not have to consist of death
or serious bodily injury; it does not have to be directed at the defendant, but can be directed at another; it does not have to be immediate,
but can be a long, wasting oppression.34 However, since the standard of
"a person of reasonable firmness" is used, it should be clear that threats
to property or reputation would not suffice to constitute duress.3 5 On
the other hand, the standard of "a person of reasonable firmness" is not
an entirely external standard, for the Crimes Code adds the phrase "in
•.. [the actor's] situation." 36
The provision set forth in subsection (b) is also new. Its main application is with regard to persons who connect themselves with criminal
activity and it states the rule that if the defendant had full opportunity
37
to avoid the coercion, the defense is not available.
The Model Penal Code contained a subsection (c) which was not
enacted by Pennsylvania. It provided that:
It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her
husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a
defense under this section. The presumption that a woman, acting
in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished.
Thus, the presumption that a woman, acting in the presence of her
husband, is coerced is not abolished. However, under the case law, this
38
presumption is a weak one which can be refuted by slight evidence.
VI.

ENTRAPMENT

As to the defense of entrapment, the Crimes Code provides:
(a) General rule.-A public law enforcement official or a person
acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission
33.
34.

CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 309 (1973).
For a statement of the law of duress prior to the Crimes Code, see United States v.

Anthony, 145 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comment (Tent. Draft. No. 10, 1960).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. United States v. Anthony, 145 F. Supp. 323, 339 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
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of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage
in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) making knowingly false representations designed to induce
the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by
persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
(b) Burden of proof.-Except as provided in subsection (c) of this
section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he
proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred
in response to an entrapment.
(c) Exception.-The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of
the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing
or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. 39
This provision overrules the so-called "predisposition test" of prior
law. 40 Under the Crimes Code, the rationale of the entrapment defense
is that the employment of such methods by the police shocks the moral
standards of the community. In light of this rationale, permitting the
police to employ such methods on persons who are allegedly "predisposed" to commit offenses would be self-contradictory.
According to the Model Penal Code comment, a mere offer to buy
narcotics would not be an entrapment under this provision, because it
would not create a risk of offending by the innocent. 41 However, use
42
of entreaties and overreaching appeals may give rise to the defense.
The policy underlying the exception in subsection (c) is that people
who can be persuaded to cause such a danger should be convicted, and
this situation overrides the general policy against unsavory police
conduct.

43

The law is unchanged with regard to submitting the defense of entrapment to the jury. 4 A provision in prior versions of the Crimes
Code that "the issue of entrapment shall be tried by the court in the
absence of the jury" was not enacted.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

858,

CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

18, § 313 (1973).

Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa. Super. 97, 173 A.2d 776 (1961).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (rent. Draft. No. 9, 1959).
Id.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa. Super. 97, 173 A.2d 776 (1961).
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VII.

RESISTING AN UNLAWFUL

ARREST

The Crimes Code does not provide a defense "to resist an arrest
which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the
45
arrest is unlawful."
Illinois has adopted a similar provision:
A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he
knows is being made either by a peace officer or by a private person
summoned and directed by a peace officer to make the arrest, even
if he believes
that the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in fact is
46
unlawful.
According to the Illinois commentary, this provision is:
.

*

.a deterrent to the resort to force by a person upon his own

conclusion that the arrest is unlawful, in preference to the use of
the methods provided by law for obtaining his release and redress
for the unlawful arrest ....

Such resort to force only invites the

officer to use greater force to accomplish the arrest, which he believes to be lawful, and the officer is usually the better prepared
to use force. The public interest in discouraging violence and insisting upon the use of peaceable methods of obtaining release
from arrest clearly outweighs the recognition of the feeling of the
individual

....

A partial recognition of the advisability of sanc-

tioning resistance in the case of an unlawful arrest appears in the
rule that a person who kills an officer attempting an unlawful arrest
is not justified, but is guilty of manslaughter rather than murder,
in the absence of express malice .... 47
However, under the Crimes Code, a person may use force to resist
an arrest if the arresting officer unlawfully uses or threatens deadly
force, or attempts to rape. 48 In addition, a person may use force to
49
resist an illegal arrest by a person not known to be a police officer.
Although it is no defense to use force to resist an unlawful arrest,
resisting an unlawful arrest is not a violation of the provisions of the
Crimes Code relating to resisting arrest, 50 or the provisions of the Crimes
Code relating to assaults on police officers. 51 However, resisting an un45.
46.

CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 505(b)(1)(i) (1973).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-7 (Smith-Hurd 1972).

47. Id.
48.

CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 505(b)(2) (1973).

49. Cf. People v. Lavac, 357 Ill. 554, 192 N.E. 568 (1934) (where the defendant, in his
dwelling, fired through a dosed door and killed two policemen in plain clothes, mistaking
them for "hoodlums").
50. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5104 (1973).
51. Id. §§ 2702(a)(2), (3).
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lawful arrest may be prosecuted as simple assault,5 2 aggravated assault,53
54
or criminal homicide.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Crimes Code has not changed Pennsylvania law regarding the
defendant's evidential burden as to defenses. However, it has shifted
to the Commonwealth the burden of proof as to most defenses.
The Crimes Code creates certain new defenses, such as renunciation
of criminal purpose in connection with the inchoate crimes of attempt,
solicitation and conspiracy. The rules relating to other defenses have
been modified. For example, the defense of duress has been broadened
and liberalized. On the other hand, although the defense of intoxication is enlarged to include drugged condition, it is not expected that
this expanded definition will have a practical bearing on the defense of
persons committing crimes under the influence of narcotics.
In light of these and other changes, the new Crimes Code warrants
careful study by practitioners.
APPENDIX
DEFENSES UNDER THE NEW PENNSYLVANIA
Affirmative Defenses
Credit cards4106(b)
Deceptive business practices-§ 4107(b)
Due diligence, corporations--§ 307(d)
Entrapment-§ 313(b)
Mistake as to age3102
Prohibited offensive weapons-§ 908(b)
Sexually promiscuous complainants--§ 3104
Theft
Grading3903(b)
Trade secrets-- 3930(d)
Burglary-§ 3502(b)
Compounding-§ 5108(b)
Consent--j 311
Conspiracy-§ 904(b)
Corporations307(d)
Criminal coerdon-§ 2906(b)
De minimis infractions-§ 312
Duress309
Entrapment-§ 313
Exceptions to definitions of offenses, etc.
Application of preliminary provisions-§ 107(c)
Appointment of special policemen-§ 7504(b)
52. Id. § 2701.
53. Id. § 2701(a)(1), (4).
54. Id. § 2501.
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Breach of privacy of telephone or telegraph communications--§ 5702(b)
Cruelty to animals--§ 5511(b)
Debt pooling-§ 7312(b)
Default in required appearance-§ 5124(b)
Desecration of flag-§ 2102(b)
Display of flag at public meetings-§ 2101(b)
Distribution of samples of medicine, dyes--§ 7301(b)
Duress-§ 309(b)
Entrapment-§ 313(c)
Erection of crossing signboards-§ 6906(b)
Execution of public duty-§ 504(b)
Firearms not to be carried without a license-§ 6106(b)
Fraudulent traffic in food orders-§ 7314(c)
Furnishing free insurance as inducement for purchases-§ 7310(b)
Horse racing-§ 7103(c)
Ignorance or mistake- 304
Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to solicitation or conspiracy-§ 904(b)
Incendiary devices-§ 730(b)
Insanity--Chapter 7
2904(b)
Interference with custody of childrenIntoxication or drugged condition-§ 308
Justification-§ 502
In property crimes--§ 510
Liability for conduct of another, complicity--§ 306(f)
Liability of organizations and related persons-§ 307(d)
Lie detector tests-§ 7321(b)
Manufacture, distribution or possession of master keys for motor vehicles- 909(b)
Military orders-§ 310
Mistake as to age-§ 3102
Nails and other hard substances attached to utility poles- 6905(b)
Obstructing or impeding the administration of justice by picketing-§ 5102(b)
6503(b)
Posting advertisements on property of anotherProhibited offensive weapons-§ 908(b)
Sale
Air rifles--§ 6304(c)
Solvents-§ 7303(b)
Starter pistols6303(b)
Weapons and explosives-§ 6302(b)
Selling
Fresh meats, produce and groceries, Sunday-§ 7364(c)
Personal property, Sunday-- 7363(c)
Territorial applicability-§ 102(b)
Theft by deception-§ 3922(b)
Time limitations-i 108(c)
Unlawful coercion in contracting insurance-§ 7309(b)
506(b)
Use of force for the protection of other persons7361(b)
Worldly employment or business, SundayProhibited
Bribery in official and political matters- § 4701(b)
Escape5121(c)
Impossibility-§ 901(b)
Perjury-§ 4902(b), (c)
Self-defense, unlawful arrest-§ 505(b)
Status of actor-§ 306(e)
Threats and other improper influence in official and political matters-§ 4702(b)
Renunciation
Attempt-§ 901(c)
Conspiracy-§ 903(f)
liability for conduct of another; complicity-Solicitation-§ 902(b)

306(f)
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Self-defense--§ 505
Sexually promiscuous complainants-§ 3104
Solicitation-§ 904(b)
Spouse relationships-§ 3103
Theft by extortion-§ 3923(b)
3503(c)
TrespassUnauthorized use of automobiles and other vehides-i 3928(b)
Use of force
By persons with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others-§ 509
For the protection of
Persons-I 506
Property-§ 507
In law enforcement-§ 508
In self-protection-§ 505
To pass wrongful obstructor-§ 507(f)
To prevent
Escape-§ 508(c)
Suicide or the commission of crime-§ 508(d)
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